Introduction
General equilibrium analysis provided economists with a good understanding of intraeconomy interdependence and a mature and powerful methodology of modeling it. When it became evident that economic activities had detrimental effects on ecological systems (ecosystems, for short), environmental economics developed as a branch of externality theory which, however, focuses on environment-economy interactions often in a rudimentary way only. On the other hand, natural scientists developed models of species interactions in ecosystems (population ecology), and they also study the impact of economic activities on ecosystems but anthropogenic distortions enter their analysis often as exogenous parameter shocks only. It appears, therefore, that in their studies of environment-economy interactions both disciplines, ecology and economics, are biased in opposite directions: Ecologists tend to disregard the complexity of the economic system and economists tend to neglect ecosystem complexity.
In our view, environment-economy interdependence cannot be satisfactorily studied unless both intra-economy and intra-ecosystem interdependence is explicitly modeled and unless repercussions set off in one system by disturbances in the other are captured -including the feedback of these repercussions into the system where the disturbance originated. Natural scientists use to model intra-ecosystem interdependence in dynamic multi-species population models. They apply macro approaches taking populations as basic endogenous variables and hence disregard the interactions of species at the micro level. 1 In contrast, economic modeling is, in general, microfounded relying on maximizing behavior of firms and consumers.
The present paper aims at applying economic methodology to modeling an ecosystem 2 with an emphasis on its microfoundation following, to some extent, Hannon (1976) , Crocker and Tschirhart (1992) and Tschirhart (2000) . It offers, on that basis, a formal analysis of environment-economy interdependence. Our ecosystem submodel of the short period is based on the idea that the representative organism of each species behaves 'as if' it maximizes its net energy. Our approach differs from that of Hannon, Crocker and Tschirhart in how the organisms' "production functions" (physiological functions) are specified and in the concept of short-run ecological equilibrium. In contrast to these authors we don't use equilibrating prices but assume, instead, that given the activities of all other organisms each organism acts as if it optimizes its costly offensive and defensive activities (Nash-behavior).
To outline this methodology we develop a three-species model of an ecosystem and link that model to a simple model of the economy with agricultural production and consumption.
The three species form a unidirectional non-circular food chain: buzzards feed on mice, mice feed on grain, and grain 'feeds' on solar energy. 3 There is a fourth species, in fact, the humans, who feed on grain, too. Humans are able to intervene into the ecosystem in three different ways. They can foster the growth (and harvest) of grain by farm labor input; they can use pesticides to diminish the mice population so that mice leave more grain for harvesting; and they can use resources for buzzard habitat maintenance (nature conservation) -with the consequence that buzzards prey more mice. Particular attention will be placed on the derivation of a short-run ecological equilibrium contingent on given levels of economic activities. We then integrate a model of the economy with the ecosystem model with a special focus on the interface of environment-economy interdependence. Both systems are required to settle for an equilibrium simultaneously. From the economist's perspective the ecosystem creates positive and negative externalities (Crocker and Tschirhart, 1992) emerging in agricultural production and in consumer preferences for the ecosystem (green preferences).
Section 2 of the paper elaborates on ecological interdependence as well as on the concept and properties of short-run ecological equilibrium. Section 3 combines the ecosystem model with a model of the economy and characterizes the efficient allocation. Section 4 discusses the inefficiencies of the competitive economy, specifies the types of distortions in the integrated system and briefly investigates some (limited) possibilities to restore efficiency through corrective taxes or subsidies. Section 5 introduces stock-flow relationships and sketches how short-run ecological equilibria are linked to ecosystem dynamics which may or may not drive the ecosystem toward a steady state (long-run ecological equilibrium). Section 6 concludes.
Ecological interdependence and short-run ecological equilibrium
To motivate our analysis of short-run ecological interdependence at the micro-level, consider first the standard formal description of population growth,
With n vt denoting the population of species v in period t, equation (1) gives us the rate of population growth in period t. Ecological population models use to specify the growth rate of species v in period t, h vt , to be dependent on its own population in period t, on the populations of some other species and on some vector, λ , of parameters:
In population ecology, predator-prey relationships among species or mutualism are then ex- hypotheses, but the form is ad hoc in the sense that it does not emerge as an implication of more basic hypotheses in the formal model.
In the next sections we aim at deriving functions of type (2) from species interaction in the short period in which all populations are assumed constant. To keep the exposition simple we envisage an ecosystem in a short period with three species only: buzzards, mice and grain.
These species form a unilateral non-circular food chain with buzzards feeding on mice, mice feeding on grain and grain feeding on sunlight. The focus is on representative individual organisms of each species, more specifically, on the net incremental energy these organisms are able to acquire during the period under consideration. These net energies are denoted g for grain, m for mice and b for buzzards. The organisms' net energies are, respectively, 
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where e j = energy per unit biomass of organism i (i = g, m) ; e j > 0 and constant e ij = energy intake of predator j per unit of biomass from prey i; e ij > 0 and In T m p p , (4) - (6) The role of populations in (5) and (6) is straightforward. The success of a given averting effort ( r a ) is the greater, ceteris paribus, the larger the own population is -because with increasing own population it is the more likely that the predator catches another organism -and the smaller the predator population is -because a predator-prey encounter is then less likely.
Prey abundance eases the predator's business of preying (with given predation effort) while an increase in the predator's own population reduces the preying success, ceteris paribus, because the individual predator faces competition from its own kind. p and s. Obviously, the human or economic activities form links from the economy to the ecosystem. They will be kept constant in the present section but endogenized later and then complemented by links from the ecosystem to the economy.
Recall from (6) that the net energies g or m influence some predator's productivity of hunting. It is plausible to assume that predators take these variables as given, i. e. that they ignore their indirect effect on the net energy of another species. We also assume that each prey takes as given the offensive activities of its predators, and that each predator takes as given the averting activity of its prey. As a consequence, the only variables each organism controls are its own offensive and/or defensive efforts. The principal behavioral assumption is that each organism chooses its efforts as if it maximizes its own net energy -given all other organisms' offensive and/or defensive activities.
The notion that organisms behave 'as if' they maximize their net energy is in line with Hannon (1976), Crocker and Tschirhart (1992) , Tschirhart (2000) and others. But while these authors model organisms as price takers the present model assumes Nash behavior in the absence of prices. In other words, we conceive of ecosystem interaction as a non-cooperative 11 We could have modeled the impact of k on buzzards similar as the impact of pesticides on mice -except with opposite sign. Rather than claiming empirical evidence for our procedure the main point we want to make is that human activities can affect the ecosystem in various ways.
game between the representative organisms of grain, mice and buzzards. 12 The players and their strategies are listed in 
We insert the optimal efforts (8) into (5) and (6) to obtain the best responses
Since our model describes a unilateral food chain, it is not surprising that the game disintegrates into two subgames specified in (9a) and (9b). A Nash equilibrium of these subgames consists of strategies ( , ) a y g gm * *
and ( , ) a y m mb * * determined by solving the two equations in (9a) and (9b), respectively. Total differentiation reveals that there are (equilibrium) functions
, , and such that
12 A game in normal form requires to specify the players, their strategies and their payoffs functions which map strategy profiles into payoffs. In the game under consideration, players and their strategies are well defined and payoffs are net energies. But note that the equations (7) 
To interpret (11) suppose the net energy of grain is increased. Then grain steps up its defensive effort ( ) A g g < 0 which has a negative but indirect effect on mice predation productivity.
On the other hand, due to Y g gm > 0 from (6), increasing grain energy has a direct positive effect on mice predation. We consider it plausible that the positive direct effect overcompensates the negative indirect effect. 13 We proceed to determine the equilibrium net energies by combining (7) with (8) and (10): (12) is equivalent to
13 The capacity of plants to discourage their predators from feeding on them is small if not even zero. We intro- It remains to determine the reduced form of (13). For that purpose we differentiate (13b) and
From this information we infer that there are functions G and M such that
Finally, we combine (13a) and (14b) to obtain
. By setting B k > 0 we assume (again) that the positive direct effect of buzzard habitat maintenance dominates the negative indirect effect.
The short-run ecosystem equilibrium and the impact of 'shocks' from the economic system on that equilibrium can be conveniently illustrated by recurring to the functions " , " " G M B and from (13). In figure 1 b g 
and s s = 0 .
given by an expression analogous to (11). In contrast to grain, averting behavior of mice is certainly empirically significant. We find it (again) realistic that the indirect effect is of second order only. Note also that the additional use of pesticides increases grain net energy. 15 Another interesting information is attained through comparative static analysis as follows:
We start again with an initial equilibrium for given k p s 
Efficient farming in the integrated ecosystem-economy model
In the previous section we investigated the short-run ecological equilibrium, and we provided the interface of ecosystem-economy interdependence via the economic activities
We also demonstrated how (parametric) changes of these economic activities affect the ecosystem. Now we turn to ecological-economic interaction by developing a simple model of the economy with its links to the ecosystem. 
We restrict our exposition to the case of identical consumers. With this simplification we invoke (14), (15) and (17) to rewrite (16): 
19 Corner solutions are ignored in (18). They may be relevant, however, since it may be optimal in some cases to use no pesticides at all. (18) demonstrates that for an allocation of the economic activities k g , ! and p to be efficient it is necessary to consider not only their direct productivity effect but also account for the indirect marginal benefits and costs generated by these economic activities through their impact on the ecosystem. In view of this interpretation, the left sides of (18) 
represent total direct and indirect (net) benefits of activity v and the right side shows marginal labor costs (all in terms of grain). The information (18) is summarized in

Competitive markets and taxes
We envisage a perfectly competitive economy with markets for pesticides, grain and labor, and we denote market prices by
i . There is no market for nature conservation.
As in the last section we keep grain seed constant ( s s = ) and hencesuppress the market for seed altogether. We also introduce taxes τ τ τ τ :
, ,
conservation, a tax τ ! on farm labor and a tax τ p on pesticides. Tax rates are not signconstrained (hence may turn out to be subsidies).
Recall that the production function for grain G from (14a) • Farmers who know about and take advantage of the productivity enhancing effect of pesticides but who do not care about the buzzard habitat are referred to as conventional farmers.
These farmers may disregard nature conservation either because they are ignorant about the implied productivity effect or because habitat maintenance is beyond their control due to limited property rights since the grain fields they own are only a small segment of the buzzards' • Farmers who have a full understanding of the grain production function G from (14a) and are also able to take both pesticides and habitat care into account are called green farmers.
These three types of farmers constitute three different economic scenarios each of which has two sub-scenarios depending on whether consumer preferences are green or not. We will not investigate all these scenarios in detail but it appears worthwhile to offer some discussion of their efficiency properties and comparative performance. To reduce complexity we will restrict our attention to integrated ecosystem-economy models in which positive values of nature conservation, farm labor and pesticides are efficient (as implied by (18)).
Green farming (scenario 1).
The grain production function is (14) and hence farmers solve the problem
, , ,
For an interior solution the first order conditions are
The representative consumer solves the Lagrange problem
taking m and b as given. ρ denotes total tax revenue recycled to the consumer in a lump sum fashion. In case of an interior solution the consumer's optimality condition is
Now we combine (22) and (20) to compare the result with (18). In scenario 1a the ecosystem depends unilaterally on the economy, and farmers take that linkage fully into account. In contrast, ecosystem disturbances through farming feed back into the economy in case of green preferences (scenario 1b). While the necessity of taxing pesticides was to be expected in the latter scenario, it is less obvious that efficiency requires to subsidize farm labor. As observed in the context of proposition 1, the model appears to overestimate the ecological value of farm labor because it ignores the ecological opportunity costs of growing grain.
Conventional farming (scenario 2).
We replace the farmers' maximization problem (19) by
Owing to the last inequality conventional farming induces an allocative distortion which is the only cause of inefficiency in scenario 2, if consumer preferences are not green (scenerio 2a). In case of green preferences the production externality of scenario 2a is augmented by the consumption externalities with regard of mice and buzzards (scenario 2b). Note also that with farmers of the conventional type there does not exist a tax-subsidy scheme τ τ τ τ :
On the other hand, if farmers are not able to care for the buzzards habitat themselves, ecological education and enlightenment does not help. Instead, some kind of cooperative arrangement between farmers and the owners of the habitat would be necessary to provide for efficient habitat maintenance. In case such cooperation fails or the habitat is made up of public lands and forests, the government is called for to induce or provide appropriate nature conservation services.
Ignorant farming (scenario 3). In this case, the farmers' maximization problem is 20 The reason is that the solution to (23) 
There is a second-best tax-subsidy scheme τ τ
, e j, but our conjecture is that the pertaining quantity of pesticides, p o , is greater than the efficient quantity p * .
Maximize q G m s q
Clearly, growing grain is now severely distorted by two distinct production externalities, since the farmers ignore the impact of both k and p on m.
The resultant inefficiency is further aggravated when consumer preferences are green. With the tax on farm labor being the only tax instrument left, efficiency cannot be restored, in general.
Casual observation of modern agriculture shows that farmers learnt to take advantage of the productivity effect of pesticides (and use them excessively, at times). Hence the underprovision of nature conservation services of scenario 2 may well be a more serious empirical problem than the failure of using pesticides (if and when it is appropriate) in scenario 3.
The preceding discussion is summed up in If market allocations are inefficient, the comparison of marginal conditions characterizing efficiency on the one hand and market distortions on the other hand doesn't allow for straightforward conclusions about how the inefficient market allocation deviates from the optimum.
In particular, we don't know how the net energies of mice and buzzards deviate from their optimum values. Precise answers to these questions would require numerical analysis which is beyond the scope of this paper, however. Our conjecture is that in all scenarios (except the efficient scenario 1a) the no-policy market allocation is characterized by excessive use of pesticides, by too little labor input in farming, by insufficient nature conservation and by too small net energies of mice and buzzards. Grain may be above or below its efficient level.
21 This observation does not imply that other policy instruments couldn't do the job. But the discussion of alternative instruments is beyond the scope of the present paper.
Up to this point, our integrated ecosystem-economy analysis provided a number of interesting insights and results. But since this paper is primarily about the methodology of integrated ecosystem-economy analysis, it is also necessary to spell out more explicitly the logic of the joint short-run equilibrium in both systems. (14) hold.
Hence a joint short-run equilibrium requires (i) the simultaneous determination of an equilibrium in both the ecosystem and the economy and (ii) the equilibrium allocation depends on the economic scenario as well as on the tax rates chosen (if any). To restate the observation (ii) in more formal terms we introduce the index σ = 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b to describe the scenario of the economy under consideration and write the joint equilibrium allocation as
Ecosystem dynamics and long-run ecological equilibrium
Up to this section the populations of all species, n n g m , and n b , have been set constant.
This was an appropriate assumption for the short period but it cannot be maintained, of course, when time is introduced. Now we denote the populations in period t by n vt for v = g, m, b and we stick to the simplifying assumption that grain is fully harvested in each period with a constant amount of it being retained for growing grain in the next period. This amounts to assuming n n s gt g ≡ > ( ) 0 for all t. Hence it is only the populations of mice and buzzards that change in time.
The next step is to relate equilibrium net energies m t and b t to populations. This is done in a stylized way by assuming that γ , µ and β is the constant average net energy stored in each organism of grain, mice and buzzards, respectively. Consequently, g t / γ , m t µ and b t β is the average number of new organisms bred in period t by each grain, mouse or buzzard existing at the beginning of period t. For example, m t µ = 2 34
. means that each mouse living in period t has, on average, 2.34 off-springs (which are assumed to be grown up at the end of period t). Similarly, m t µ = − 0 16 . is interpreted as a situation were the average mouse has no descendents and a 16% chance not to survive the period. Hence at the beginning of period t + 1 the populations are n n s n s g t g g , :
( ) 
Comparing (25) to (1) 
Conceptually, the sign of the derivatives
from (26) 
Concluding remarks
We first modeled short-run intra-ecosystem interdependence based on species behavior at the micro level and introduced the concept of short-run ecosystem equilibrium. Then we demonstrated that ecosystem-economy interdependence can be fruitfully studied by linking a standard perfectly competitive economy with our full-fledged (short-run) equilibrium model of the ecosystem. Owing to the interdependence of both systems, the joint equilibrium needs to be simultaneously determined. As a result, intertemporal economic performance depends on how the species populations develop over time. Conversely, the species population dynamics depend on farming styles (ignorant, conventional, green) on consumer valuation of the ecosystem (preferences being green or not) and on ecosystem policies (here only: taxes or subsidies).
If preferences are green, farming and other human activities which have an impact on the ecosystem create vast positive or negative consumption externalities. A rather unexpected result of green preferences is that subsidizing farm labor is efficiency enhancing even though this conclusion may not be robust when ecological opportunity costs of farming are properly accounted for. With our main focus on agriculture we showed that, via ecological food chains, agriculture has an indirect influence on some of those species, exemplified by buzzards in our simple model, that are not directly linked to farming. Moreover, in the light of our analysis the concept of efficient farming needs to be closely reconsidered depending on which and/or how many of the farming-related ecosystem interdependencies farmers take into account. While these insights are not entirely novel, our objective was to derive them in a formal well-defined model that explicitly allows to deal with relevant ecological interactions and 'shocks' spreading from one system to the other including feedback effects into the system where they originated.
We emphasized in the introduction that the main contribution of the present paper is to suggest a new methodological approach to the analysis of ecosystem-economy interdependence. Hence our principal focus was on the conceptual procedure rather than on substantial results. Even though some interesting specific conclusions have been reached, important questions remained unanswered especially about the characteristics of ecosystem dynamics and of long-run ecological equilibrium. Among the issues on the agenda of future research is also the question, e. g., under which conditions one would obtain, in the framework suggested here, predator-prey population interactions of the Lotka-Volterra type. In our model, population dynamics with endogenously determined growth rates can probably only be handled in numerical analysis. As is well known, there is a considerable cost of calibration in terms of loss in algebraic generality. But the upside is that one can add much more realistic structure to the model so that it is no longer allegoric (see footnote 3) but can be applied and/or tested in realworld case studies.
Another possibly controversial issue is whether it is sensible to model all economic and ecological agents as myopic maximizers, as we did. In our view, maximizing within the time horizon of the short period appears to be appropriate for individual organisms in the ecosystem. But economic agents are forward looking, at least to some extent, and therefore it might be more realistic to conceive of them as intertemporal maximizers. It is not so clear, however, whether assuming rational expectations and maximizing over an infinite time horizon is more realistic than the opposite polar case of myopic maximization in the short period. Anyway, it seems necessary and worthwhile to further follow both lines of modeling, since the comparison promises to give additional insights into the important issue of sustainable development.
When environmental and nature conservation policies are at issue, myopia is definitively not an adequate guideline. In our paper, we did not give adequate attention to such policy issues. We investigated only briefly the potential and limits of welfare improving tax-subsidy schemes applied in the short period (and hence being also myopic) which allowed us to identify such tax policies as a major determinant of population growth rates and hence of ecosystem dynamics, more generally. The few myopic tax policies discussed in the paper only served the role to point out that in most economic scenarios there is scope for efficiency-enhancing environmental and agricultural policies. However, since the relevant policy goals are about ecosystem development and sustainability, all serious policies need to focus on the intertemporal development and control of both the ecosystem and the economy. Addressing these issues on the basis the integrated analytical framework suggested here appears to be promising.
